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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 




CATHRYN E. PFANNENSTIEL, ) 
) 
Defendant & Appellant. ) 
Case No. J...!l.!] 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appeal from the denial of a motion to 
quash the information, and the appellant's 
subsequent conviction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with issuing 
a check against insufficient funds in violation 
of Section 76-20-11, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) 
as amended. The defendant moved that the in-
formation alleged no crime under the above 
cited statute. The motion was denied and this 
appeal was taken from said denial and defen-
dant's subsequent conviction. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the 
denial of her motion to quash and her subse-
quent conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Cathryn E. Pfannenstiel, 
on the 14th day of July, 1967, drew a check on 
the Sunset Branch of the Clearfield State Bank 
payable to Ogden Tire Center in payment for 
parts and services for her car in the amount 
of $11.49. (T-5). Said check was written for 
the exact amount of the bill and the defendant 
received no money in return. (R-15). 
The check was presented to the drawee 
bank for payment on July 19, 1967, and again 
on August 1st, 1967. (T-10). On both occasions 
there were insufficient funds in the defendant's 
account to cover the check and the check was 
dishonored. 
3 
On December 8, 1967, the defendant was 
charged by information with the issuing of a 
check against insufficient funds in violation 
of Section 76-20-11, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) 
as amended. (R-2). The defendant, by her 
attorney, filed a motion to quash the informa-
tion, (R-5) on the grounds that said informa-
tion did not set forth a crime under the above 
cited section. Said motion was denied,f~-11) 
and the defendant was convicted. 
From the denial of the motion to quash 
and defendant's subsequent conviction this 
appeal was taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1 
THE COMPLAINT AND EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF BY THE STATE DOES NOT SET FORTH 
A CRIME UNDER SECTION 76-20-11, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1953) AS AMENDED. 
4 
The courts have consistently held that 
before one may be punished under a criminal 
statute their acts must be clearly within the 
scope of the statute. 
The acts of the defendant in the case at 
bar are not included within the scope of Sec-
t ion 76-20-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as 
amended. 
The Utah legislature by specifically mak-
ing illegal the issuance of bogus checks for 
the "payment of money" and for "payment of 
wages 1 ' have by imp! ication excluded al 1 other 
acts not enumerated. 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code a check 
is not money. 
It is inconsistent to interpret the terms 
11 for the payment of money11 as meaning "in sub-
stitution for monei' and at the same time to 
enunciate specific instances in which the 
5 
issuance of a bogus check would be a crime, as 
the first interpretation would include all in-
stances in which bogus checks were knowingly 
offered as payment. 
The defendant in the case at bar received 
no money in exchange for the check she wrote, 
nor was the check issued for the payment of 
wages. As a result that act of the defendant 
was not within Section 76-20-11, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended and her conviction 




THE INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF BY THE STATE DOES NOT SET FORTH 
A CRIME UNDER SECTION 76-20-11 OF THE UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED AS AMENDED (1953). 
Section 76-20-11 as amended in 1965 reads 
essentially as follows: 
11 
••• Any person who for h imse If or as 
the agent or representative of another 
or as an officer of a corporation, will-
fully, with intent to defraud, makes or 
draws or utters or delivers any check, 
or draft or order upon any bank or deposi-
tory or person, or firm, or corporation, 
for the payment of money or wages for labor 
performed, knowing at the time of such mak-
ing, drawing, uttering, or delivering that 
the maker or drawer or the corporation has 
not sufficient funds in, or credit with 
said bank or depository, or person, or 
firm, or corporation, for the payment of 
such checks, drafts, or order, in full 
upon its presentation, •.. , is punish-
able by imprisonment in the county jail 
for not more than one year, or in the 
State prison for not more than five years. 11 
(Emphasis supplied). 
7 
A. A particular act must be clearly within 
the scope of the statute in order for a 
conviction thereunder to stand. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
has held that: 
rr ••• Before one may be punished it must 
appear that his case is plainly within 
the statute; there are no constructive 
offenses. United States v. Lacher, 134 
U.S. 624, 628, 33 Led. 1080, 1083, 10 
S. Ct 625; United States v. Chase, 135 
U.S. 255, 261, 34 Led 117, TQ"'S:" Ct 756. 
Again in United States v. Williams, 341 
U.S. 70, 95 Led. 758, 71 S. Ct. 581, The 
Supreme Court stated: 
"The criminal statutes should be given 
the meaning their language most obviously 
invites; their scope should not be extended 
to conduct not clearly within their terms. 11 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court succinctly 
stated the general policy which whould be 
applied in the application of statutory law 
in American First Title and Trust Co. v. ~ 
Federal Savings and Loan, 415 P2d, 930,939, 
8 
(1966), when it stated in reference to a 
statute regulating deficiency judgments: 
"· •. nothing may be read into a statute 
which is not within the manifest inten-
tion of the legislature as gathered from 
the act itself and that a statute should 
not be construed any more broadly or 
given any greater effect than its terms 
require." 
Along the same lines the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: 
11The interpretation of a statute must 
be based on the language used, and courts 
have no power to rewrite a statute to 
make it conform to intention not expressed. 11 
Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. V. 
Public Service Commission. 155 P2d, 184 
( 1945). 
The defendant asserts that the act for which 
she was convicted is not covered by Section 
76-20-11, of the Utah Code Annotated as amend-
ed, and that her conviction must be set aside. 
B. The act for which the defendant was con-
victed does not constitute a crime under 
Section 76-20-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
as amended. 
9 
Bad check statutes are typically of two 
different types. 
The most common type is that which con-
demns the giving of bogus checks for specific 
items. An example of this type of bad check 
statute is found in Wyoming and Oklahoma. 
The Wyoming statute reads essentially as 
fol lows: 
"Whoever, with intent to defraud by ob-
taining money, merchandize, property-,-
credit, .£!:,other things of value ..• 
or who, in the payment of~ obligation, 
shall make,draw, utter or deliver any 
check ••. knowing at the time of such 
making .•. that •.. (he) has not 
sufficient funds .•. shall be guilty 
of a felony •.. 11 Section 6-39 W.S. 
( 1957). (Emph.:is is supp 1 i ed) . 
The Oklahoma bad check statute is similar 
to that of Wyoming. 21 D.S. 1951, Section 1541. 
The second type of bad check statute is 
more general and is evidenced by the statute 
now in force in Arizona. 
The Arizona statute reads essentially as 
fol lows: 
10 
"A person who for himself or for another, 
willfully, with intent to defraud, makes, 
draws, utters or delivers to another per-
son or persons a check or checks or draft 
or drafts on a bank or depository for~­
ment of money, knowing at the time of such 
making, drawing, uttering or delivering, 
that he or his principal does not have 
sufficient funds in, or credit with, such 
bank or depository to meet the check or 
checks or draft or drafts in full upon 
presentation, shall be guilty as follows. 
" A.R.S. Section 13-316 (1965) 
(Emphasis added). 
As a general rule bad check statutes 
which 1 ist the various situations in which the 
issuance of a bogus check would be a crime, 
limit the application of such statutes to the 
instances enumerated. Bailey v. State of 
Wyoming, 408 P2d, 244 (1965); Snider v. State 
of Oklahoma, 338 P2d 892, (1959); State of -----
West Virginia v. H. B. Stout, 95 S.E. 2d 639. 
In the Stout case, supra, the statute in 
question condemned any person who made, issued 
or delivered to another person, for value, any 
check or draft on any bank and obtains from 
11 
such other any credit, money, goods, or other 
property of value, having no funds or insuff i-
cient funds to cover it. 
The court in applying the statute held 
that when the defendant gave a bogus check in 
payment for bulldozer work done by one J. G. 
Singleton, that such act did not constitute 
a crime under their statute. The court said 
that the payment by check was conditioned and 
when such payment aborted no harm was done to 
Singleton because he still had a right of 
action and that no value flowed to the defen-
dant because he remained liable on the debt. 
Statutes of the second type are more 
general in that they condemn the writing of 
bogus checks "for the payment of money". They 
are construed broadly and require only that 
the defendant write a check on insufficient 
funds with intent to defraud. State v. 
12 
Devinney, 403 P2d 921 (1965), State v. Weis 
375 P2d 735, (1962). 
Originally the Utah bad check statute was 
almost identical to that of Arizona, using the 
same "for payment of moneyi 1 terminology. In 1965 
this statute was amended and the words 11 or for 
wages for work performed" were added. By so 
amending the statute the legislature deprived 
it of its general nature and converted it into 
a statute which specifically prohibits the issu-
ing of checks on insufficient funds for two pur-
poses only, for the payment of money and for 
wages. 
It is a general principal of interpreta-
tion that the mention of one thing in a statute 
implies the exclusion of another; expressio 
unius est. exclusio alterius. Walla Walla v. 
Walla Wal la Water Co. 172 U.S. 1, 43 Led 341, 
19 S.Ct. 77, 
13 
The Utah Supreme Court first enunciated 
this doctrine in Utah in 1899 when it stated: 
11Where a statute enumerates the persons 
and things to be affected by its provi-
sions, there is an implied exclusion of 
others, and the natural inference follows 
that it is not intended to be general. 11 
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 
457, 59 p 96 (1899). 
The State Legislature by specifically desig-
nating two sets of circumstances under which a 
bad check charge would lie has, by implication 
excluded all others. 
Section 76-20-11 as amended in 1965, clearly 
provides that checks issued for two items, and 
two items only can be the basis for a criminal 
conviction thereunder. 
The statute specifically provides that the 
check drawn on insufficient funds must be given 
for 11 payment of money 11 or 11 for wages for labor 
performed11 • 
If the Legislature had wished to go further, 
14 
as most state legislatures have, they would 
have included other things of value or credit 
or an account, or for goods or property. 
In the case at bar the defendant's check 
was given in payment for parts and services to 
her car. (T-5) The defendant received no money, 
the check being written for the exact amount of 
the bi 11. (R-15). 
Under the circumstances of this case by 
no interpretation could the check of defendant 
be considered as having been given 11 for the pay-
ment of money" or 11wages 11 as required by the 
statute. 
It must be pointed out rtt this point that 
a check is not money. The Utah Commercial Code 
as set forth in 70A-l-201, (24) Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953) as amended defines money as follows: 
"Money means a medium of exchange authori-
zed or adopted by a domestic or foreign 
f • II government as a part o its currency • 
15 
For the above reasons the defendant's 
check was not given for the 11 payment of moneyi • 
or for "wages" and therefore was not within the 
purview of the statute here in question and her 
conviction must be reversed. 
C. The terms 11 for payment of money" as used 
in Section 76-20-11 as amended in 1965, cannot 
be interpreted to mean 11 as a substitute for 
money". 
The Utah Supreme Court in reference to 
statutory interpretation stated that: 
1 ~he meaning of doubtful words or phrases 
must be determined in light of and must 
take their character from associated words 
or phrases. 11 Heathman v. Giles, 374 P2d 
8 3 9' ( 1 96 2) • 
In 1 ight of the aforementioned principals 
it is inconsistent that the legislature could 
interpret the terms 11 for the payment of money11 
as meaning 11 in substitution of money" and at 
the same time think it necessary to provide 
another prohibited category of activity. As a 
matter of logic the first interpretation would 
extend to a check issued on insufficient funds 
--
16 
for the payment of wages because the check 
would be issued as a substitute for money. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief the 
acts of the defendant did not constitute a 
crime under 76-20-11, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) as amended, and the defendant's con-
viction must be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WM. H. BOWMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
Weber County Bar Legal 
Services, 203 24th 
Street, Ogden, Utah 
